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ORIGINALISM: HEALTH BENEFITS AND RISKS
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Neil S. Siegel*
Living Originalism. By Jack M. Balkin. Cambridge and London:
Harvard University Press. 2011. Pp. 339. $35.
Introduction
Jack Balkin’s Living Originalism1 is a sweet read. It is beautifully written, illuminating, and provocative. It is conducive to deep reflection about
foundational questions.
In the book, Balkin reasons from two points of view—the perspective of
the constitutional system as a whole and the perspective of the faithful participant in that system (p. 130). First, he provides a systemic account of
constitutional change, which he calls “living constitutionalism.” Second, he
offers an approach to constitutional interpretation and construction, which
he calls “framework originalism.” These two components—living constitutionalism and framework originalism—together constitute his overall theory
of “living originalism.”
Reasoning from the systemic perspective, Balkin develops an attractive
theory of the processes of constitutional change. His account features prominently the roles of citizens, social movements, civil society, politicians, and
judges in shaping the meaning of the Constitution in practice. His approach
is descriptively more accurate than its main competitors and normatively
appealing in its emphasis on the need for invested participants in the constitutional system to continuously perceive and vindicate the preconditions for
the legitimacy of the system.
Balkin may, however, be too quick to dismiss a concern held by some
invested participants. These participants fear “that arguing that their views
are correct is . . . undermined . . . by the theory of how the constitutional
system produces legitimacy over time” (p. 131). To understand from the
systemic perspective that “we are . . . participants in a constitutional system
* Professor of Law and Political Science, Co-Director, Program in Public Law, Duke
Law School. For illuminating conversations, I thank Bruce Ackerman, Jack Balkin, Curtis
Bradley, James Boyle, Bernard Burk, Josh Chafetz, Michael Dorf, Barry Friedman, R. Craig
Green, Linda Greenhouse, Ralf Michaels, Margaret Lemos, Sanford Levinson, Dahlia
Lithwick, Robert Post, H. Jefferson Powell, Jedediah Purdy, Reva Siegel, Ernest Young, workshop participants at Duke Law School, and participants in “Constitutional Interpretation and
Change: A Conference on Jack Balkin’s Living Originalism,” which was held at Yale Law
School on April 27 and 28, 2012. It is rare to encounter a legal academic of Jack’s stature who
is also a mensch. I am honored to call him my friend.
1. Jack M. Balkin is the Knight Professor of Constitutional Law and the First
Amendment, Yale Law School.
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in which dissent and contestation, persuasion and argument, help make the
system democratically legitimate over time”2 is to acknowledge that the
meaning of the Constitution in practice changes over time. It is, therefore, to
stare the fact of interpretive discretion in the face.3 And facing up to the fact
of discretion encourages consciousness of one’s own consciousness, which
may cause those who suffer from “modernist anxiety” to question whether
they can be confident that their own constitutional views are correct.4 Such
self-confidence, however, underwrites effective advocacy for those who do
not consider themselves free to act as if they were certain they were right
when they are, in fact, not certain.5
Reasoning from the individual perspective, Balkin provides a persuasive,
if imperfect, account of the characteristic importance of constitutional text
in the American tradition. But Balkin does not seem to register the potential
consequences of turning to “originalism” given how long the term has been
associated in public debates with a conservative political practice. A progressive declaration in 2013 that “we are all originalists now” would risk
lending unintended support to the ongoing fruits of conservative originalism, including an unsettling of the New Deal Settlement, the Second
Reconstruction, and more.
Such a development would be troubling not only from the perspective of
progressive constitutionalists, but also from the perspective of the constitutional system. Those who either misunderstand Balkin or wish to repurpose
him—as Balkin seeks to repurpose originalism—might use a progressive
embrace of Balkin’s very thin version of originalism to throw everyone into
an easily caricatured originalist camp. That misappropriation, in turn, might
undermine the diversity of constitutional opinion that exists in fact and that
secures the legitimacy of the system as a whole.
Part I describes Balkin’s “living originalism.” It separates the theory into
its component parts and then considers the theory as a whole. Part II analyzes some potential consequences of embracing Balkin’s living
constitutionalism. It mostly applauds his systemic account of constitutional
change but questions its compatibility with effective advocacy from the individual perspective. Part III examines the case for Balkin’s framework
originalism. It argues that framework originalism better accounts for the
presumptively exalted status of the constitutional text than does David
2. Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Redemption 183–84 (2011) [hereinafter Balkin, Constitutional Redemption].
3. It may be possible to view the law as fully determinate but still think that persuasion and argument are necessary to legitimate it. Balkin, however, believes that the meaning of
the Constitution in practice changes over time, and that it must in order to be legitimate. Balkin is right to believe that the meaning of the Constitution in practice changes over time, as the
recent fight over health care reform illustrates. In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012), five justices articulated a novel constitutional
distinction between regulating and requiring commerce.
4. For a discussion of modernist anxiety, see infra Section II.B.
5. In this regard, legal academics may be differently situated from advocates and judges. See infra Section II.B.
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Strauss’s common law constitutionalism, but questions the political consequences of embracing the “O” word. This Review concludes by identifying
a common theme connecting the concerns expressed here about Living
Originalism. That common theme is the difference between constitutional
theory in an ideal world and constitutional theory in the fallen world we
inhabit. In this fallen world, our adversaries may not fight fair, we may feel
disconnected from the past, and our words may have effects in the world
that we do not intend but that we ignore at our peril.
I. Living Originalism
As a description of Balkin’s project, “living originalism” may seem a
misnomer. An “originalism” that is “living” may be a contradiction in terms.
After all, “[l]iving constitutionalists argue that the practical meaning of the
Constitution changes—and should change—in response to changing conditions.”6 “Originalists,” by contrast, “argue that some aspect or feature of the
Constitution is fixed when the Constitution—or a subsequent amendment to
the Constitution—is adopted, that it is fixed because of the act of adoption,
and that this fixed meaning is binding as law today.”7 If living constitutionalism focuses on flux, originalism focuses on fixity.
As these quotations indicate, Balkin is hardly confused about this. His
“living originalism” is best viewed as a contraction. It combines two
ideas—living constitutionalism and framework originalism—that together
constitute his overall theory. In Balkin’s work, “living constitutionalism”
plus “framework originalism” equals “living originalism.” I consider each
component separately and then consider them together.
A. Living Constitutionalism
If constitutional theories had colors associated with them, originalism’s
banner would be black or blood red. These colors symbolize death, and
originalists like Justice Scalia praise the “dead” Constitution.8 In vivid contrast, living constitutionalism would fly a green flag. If any season
symbolizes life, it is spring, and if any color symbolizes springtime, it is
green.
Judging from the front of the jacket of Balkin’s book, which is mostly
black and deep red with just a hint of green light shining through, one might
think that his theory is more originalist than living constitutionalist. (One
might further suspect this because “living” modifies “originalism” in the
book’s title.) The back of the jacket, however, is all green. Moreover, when
6. Balkin, Constitutional Redemption, supra note 2, at 226.
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, The Undead Constitution, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 2011,
2011 (2012) (“In what might be regarded as his standard ‘stump’ speech, Justice Scalia has
repeatedly championed what he calls the ‘dead Constitution.’ ”); This American Life: Scalia
Vigorously Defends a “Dead” Constitution (NPR radio broadcast Apr. 28, 2008), available at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=90011526.

Siegel FTP5 B.doc

934

3/13/2013 9:33 AM

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 111:931

one opens the book, one notices that the jacket is all green on the inside as
well. And if one removes the jacket, one observes that the book cover itself
is mostly green. Finally, if one sifts through the first few pages, one discovers that Balkin dedicates the book to his Yale colleagues Reva Siegel and
Robert Post, two prominent living constitutionalists.9 All of this is symbolically appropriate. In Balkin’s theory, living constitutionalism is no qualifier
or sideshow. It is the main event.
Balkin argues that each generation of Americans must implement the
Constitution’s text, rules, standards, and principles in its own way, which it
does “through building political institutions, passing legislation, and creating precedents, both judicial and nonjudicial” (p. 3). He calls this process of
fleshing out the often underdeterminate constitutional text “constitutional
construction.” According to Balkin, constitutional constructions by previous
generations help to “shape how succeeding generations will understand and
apply the Constitution in their time” (p. 4). He distinguishes constitutional
construction from constitutional interpretation, which he defines as the act
of ascertaining the original semantic meaning of the text (p. 4).
“Living constitutionalism” is Balkin’s term for this interpretive account
of how the American constitutional system functions and legitimates itself.
In his view, this account is “the best way to understand the interpretive practices of our constitutional tradition and the work of the many political and
social movements that have transformed our understandings of the Constitution’s guarantees” (p. 4). Balkin underscores that living constitutionalism
validates the fruits of this social practice, fruits that many Americans today
view as the practice’s greatest achievements rather than as pragmatic exceptions or mistakes that they are stuck with out of respect for stare decisis.10
Examples of these fruits include Brown v. Board of Education11 and the civil
rights revolution, Social Security and other safety-net programs, and the
equal citizenship stature of women.12
In Balkin’s hands, then, living constitutionalism explains the role of
constitutional politics in shaping constitutional constructions.13 It also
provides “a theory about how the entire system of constitutional
construction—including the work of the political branches, courts, political
parties, social movements, interest groups, and individual citizens—is consistent with democratic legitimacy” (p. 279). Living constitutionalism does
not tell judges how to decide constitutional questions.14 Indeed, it is not a
9. See, e.g., Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Democratic Constitutionalism, in The
Constitution in 2020, at 25 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009); Robert Post &
Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L.
Rev. 373 (2007).
10. Pp. 110–12 (critiquing this strategy of conservative originalism).
11. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
12. See p. 109 (discussing these and other examples).
13. See p. 279 (writing that living constitutionalism “explain[s] how constitutional
construction occurs in response to constitutional politics”).
14. Pp. 277–78 (noting that living constitutionalism is not “a philosophy of judging that
explains and justifies how courts should interpret the Constitution”).
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theory of how anyone should decide constitutional questions. Balkin does
not view living constitutionalism as a decisional approach that can compete
with the various flavors of non-Balkinian originalism.
B. Framework Originalism
If constitutional construction does the work of building out, and if living
constitutionalism explains how that building out occurs and legitimates itself, “framework originalism” identifies what is being built out. This phrase
captures Balkin’s view that the Constitution provides “an initial framework
for governance that sets politics in motion” (p. 3). Framework originalism is
a (mostly underdeterminate) decisional approach. It requires fidelity to, and
only to, the framework—to the original semantic meaning of the constitutional text and “to the rules, standards, and principles stated by the
Constitution’s text.”15 Balkin distinguishes his theory of interpretation from
“skyscraper originalism” (pp. 21–23), which is what most people imagine
when they imagine originalism. Skyscraper originalists make much greater
demands on the present by requiring fidelity to original intentions, purposes,
or expected applications, even when they purport to care only about semantic meaning.16
In Balkin’s view, regarding oneself as bound by more than framework
originalism renders one unable to explain the American constitutional tradition, including its greatest achievements. Moreover, regarding oneself as
bound by less than framework originalism puts one in essentially the same
boat as David Strauss’s common law constitutionalism.17 As Balkin understands Strauss’s view, fidelity to the text is nothing more than a convention,
and no part of the text is unalterable through common law methods. Balkin
rejects this position as inconsistent with the actual role of the text in constitutional practice. Framework originalism requires fidelity to original
meaning, nothing more and nothing less.
C. Living Originalism
Distinguishing Balkin’s living constitutionalism and framework
originalism in the way that I have indicates that living originalism is a bit of
an odd duck. (That is not criticism. My children and I happen to love ducks,
including odd ones.) Living originalism combines a particular conception of
the systemic point of view (living constitutionalism) with a certain
15. P. 3; see also p. 45.
16. See p. 104 (“[T]oday’s original meaning originalists often view original expected
applications as very strong evidence of original meaning . . . . Hence, even though conservative originalists may distinguish between the ideas of original meaning and original expected
applications in theory, they often conflate them in practice.”).
17. For Strauss’s most recent articulation of his theory, see David A. Strauss, The
Living Constitution (2010). See also David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 877 (1996); David A. Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground,
and Jefferson’s Principle, 112 Yale L.J. 1717 (2003).
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conception of the individual point of view (framework originalism). This is
striking, and it may have implications for the efficacy of constitutional advocacy in the present, as I suggest in Part II.
Something else about living originalism is evident from the above description. To those who adopt the individual perspective, the theory offers
little guidance regarding how to decide constitutional questions about which
people disagree. Balkin’s living constitutionalism self-consciously has nothing to say about the matter, and complying with framework originalism is
not difficult. Anyone can do it.
Indeed, it is something that almost everyone already does by not arguing, say, that a thirty-four-year-old can become president.18 It is something
almost everyone already does by possessing some view of constitutional
equality, ranging from that of the Plessy Court,19 to the Brown Court,20 to
any member of the Roberts Court.21 In Balkin’s view, the original semantic
meaning of “equal protection of the laws” is the same as its contemporary
meaning.22 He does not identify this meaning, but it is capacious.
Balkin remits the resolution of constitutional questions, whether by citizens, politicians, or judges, to the modalities that characterize familiar
constitutional practice: history, structure, precedent, ethos, and consequences.23 In other words, Balkin’s “construction zone” is enormous. Readers
must look elsewhere if they seek a decision theory to supplant the varieties
of non-Balkinian originalism, which purport to give relatively detailed answers to the question of what the Constitution means in specific
controversies. For this reason, I refer to Balkinian originalism as “Diet
Originalism,” and I contrast it with what Balkin calls “skyscraper originalism” and I call “Originalism Classic.” Diet Originalism bears some relation
to Originalism Classic in terms of outward appearance, but it contains little
of the constraint that can weigh down the user.24
To be clear, so far I mean to describe Balkin’s theory. I do not mean to
criticize it. For example, I do not fault Balkin for failing to provide a robust

18. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (providing that the president must be at least thirty-five years old).
19. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954).
20. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
21. See, for example, the five opinions in Parents Involved in Community Schools v.
Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
22. Balkin, Constitutional Redemption, supra note 2, at 231.
23. For a classic discussion, see generally Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate:
Theory of the Constitution (1982).
24. Of course, the phrase “Originalism Classic” risks effacing the many varieties of
originalism that purport to constrain discretion much more than Balkin’s originalism. For
discussions of different kinds of originalism, see generally, for example, Mitchell N. Berman,
Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (2009), and Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith,
Living Originalism, 59 Duke L.J. 239 (2009). My purpose, however, is to distinguish
Balkinian originalism from other originalisms, not to distinguish among the other originalisms.

Siegel FTP5 B.doc

April 2013]

3/13/2013 9:33 AM

Jack Balkin’s Rich Historicism

937

theory of constitutional decision. I do not believe there is one, at least if one
wants to account for constitutional practice as it has existed over the course
of American history and probably must continue to exist if constitutional
law is to retain its legitimacy.25 Moreover, I share Balkin’s view that the
constraining capacity of interpretive theories is greatly exaggerated relative
to other limits on judicial authority.26
II. Living Constitutionalism
This Part analyzes Balkin’s systemic theory of constitutional change. It
mostly, though not entirely, approves of his account. This Part suggests,
however, that an invested participant who embraces Balkin’s systemic account may be at a disadvantage in advocating particular interpretations of
the Constitution.
A. Historicism, Discretion, and Advocacy
Constitutional theory requires a persuasive account of legitimate constitutional change, and there is much to admire about Balkin’s. It includes all
of the relevant actors, movements, and institutions in the American constitutional system. Moreover, it accounts for the pervasiveness of constitutional
change, both large and small, over the course of American history, regardless of whether the public is aware that change is occurring at a particular
time. In addition, Balkin does not rely on controversial claims that certain
federal laws or Supreme Court decisions are equivalent to Article V
amendments. Balkin’s living constitutionalism is thus descriptively more
accurate than an account that rests only on Article V, and it avoids many of
the criticisms that have been directed at Bruce Ackerman’s influential theory
of “constitutional moments.”27
There is, however, one nontrivial defect with Balkin’s systemic account:
his framework originalism bleeds into it. As noted above, he approvingly
describes social movements as engaged in constitutional construction. Construction, however, presupposes respect for the constitutional framework.
This is because construction, unlike simply starting over again, takes place
on the framework. The problem for Balkin is that successful social
25. I have elsewhere argued that constitutional law must take some account of the conditions of its public legitimation. See generally Neil S. Siegel, The Virtue of Judicial
Statesmanship, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 959 (2008).
26. See Jack M. Balkin, The Roots of the Living Constitution, 92 B.U. L. Rev. 1129,
1131 (2012) (“Judicial constraint . . . occurs not because judges consciously follow a single
correct method of interpretation, but because a host of different institutional factors limit who
can become a judge, structure judicial decision making, and influence the professional and
constitutional culture in which judges reason and attempt to persuade their audiences.”). For
further discussion, see pp. 16–20.
27. See generally 1 Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (1991); 2
Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Transformations (1998); Bruce Ackerman, The Living
Constitution, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 1737 (2007). For Balkin’s discussion of Ackerman, see pp.
309–12.
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movements may have little idea about the original semantic meaning of constitutional language.
For example, many political advocates for gay rights presumably have
no knowledge of the original meaning of the Equal Protection Clause, let
alone the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.28 Even so, their activities and those of their adversaries have
greatly impacted the constructions that enter public discourse and, eventually, judicial decisions.29 Balkin’s systemic theory of constitutional change
can account for this phenomenon only if he insulates his living constitutionalism from his framework originalism. The book, fairly read, does not
suggest that he realizes this.
Also worthy of examination is Balkin’s claim that one can adopt both
living constitutionalism and framework originalism without encountering a
performative contradiction or engaging in self-undermining behavior.30 Balkin brilliantly invites us to inquire whether the same person can
simultaneously apprehend the historical processes of constitutional change
from the systemic point of view while confidently making claims on the
Constitution in the present from the individual point of view.
Balkin recognizes that the systemic perspective must be consistent with
the individual perspective (p. 130). “[P]eople who make arguments internal
to the practice of constitutional law,” he writes, “should not have to worry
that arguing that their views are correct is in any way undermined or contradicted by the theory of how the constitutional system produces legitimacy
over time” (p. 131). He insists that his systemic and individual perspectives
are consistent.31 Specifically, Balkin writes that embracing constitutional
historicism implies adopting a twofold apprehension of oneself as a participant in the constitutional system.32 On the one hand, “[w]e are participants
in a constitutional system with decided views on what is a good and bad
interpretation of the Constitution at our moment in time.”33 On the other
hand, “we are also participants in a constitutional system in which dissent
and contestation, persuasion and argument, help make the system democratically legitimate over time.”34 A Balkin-style historicist reasons both
synchronically and diachronically. While we may think that our own interpretations are right, “we also understand that people’s minds can be changed
and have been changed, including our own.”35 What is more, we must never
28. See infra notes 84–86 and accompanying text.
29. Thus Michael Dorf writes that “genuinely progressive movements of the sort that
Balkin rightly celebrates do better to use the Constitution, if at all, strategically or even disingenuously.” Dorf, supra note 8, at 2054.
30. P. 131; Balkin, Constitutional Redemption, supra note 2, at 183–84.
31. P. 131 (“[T]here is no contradiction between these two perspectives.”).
32. Balkin, Constitutional Redemption, supra note 2, at 183 (“A historicist view
of the Constitution implies a dual understanding of ourselves as participants.”).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 183–84.
35. Id. at 184.
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forget that “we have many of the constitutional views we have because of
the constitutional culture in which we live.”36
I agree that there is no tension between the systemic and individual perspectives if one focuses only on fidelity to the original meaning of a
constitutional provision, and if the original meaning is determinate. This is
because of Balkin’s division of labor between living constitutionalism and
framework originalism. As noted, living constitutionalism is the realm of
change, and framework originalism is the realm of stability up until ratification of an Article V amendment. Insofar as Balkin’s individual perspective
concerns only the determinate framework, there can be no tension with his
systemic account of constitutional change. The framework provides clear
criteria of validity for constitutional views, and the multitude of permissible
changes in the Constitution in practice over time must respect those criteria.37
For Balkin, however, the framework decides far fewer questions than do
typical versions of originalism. When one operates within his spacious
“construction zone,” there are no clear criteria of constitutional validity. The
reason why “dissent and contestation, persuasion and argument”38 are possible is that the legal materials available for use in construction are
underdeterminate and often severely so. Dissent, contestation, persuasion,
and argument are unheard of when the text is determinate. Thus, we do not
debate whether there must be two houses of Congress.39
Participants in the constitutional system who have adopted Balkin’s systemic perspective necessarily know all of this because underdeterminacy is
obvious from the systemic perspective. Knowing this, they have no choice
but to face up to the fact of interpretive discretion. And staring discretion in
the face may give an interpreter reason to “worry that arguing that their
views are correct is . . . undermined . . . by the theory of how the constitutional system produces legitimacy over time” (p. 131). Framed precisely, the
systemic perspective may undermine the individual perspective because understanding the Constitution from a systemic perspective may require one to
hold beliefs or attitudes that are in tension with the beliefs or attitudes needed to persuade others about the best meaning of the Constitution. To put it
bluntly, one may be forced to lie or disguise her actual beliefs about the
truth of what she is arguing in public in order to participate effectively in the
system. How does one argue with certainty that one is right and others are
wrong when one is acutely aware of the discretion and judgment that one is
exercising?
One can endeavor to negotiate this problem by being a bit less certain—
that is, by being careful about how one characterizes one’s constitutional
arguments from the individual perspective. Specifically, one can avoid
36. Id.
37. Again, I question whether social movements typically behave this way. See supra
text following note 27.
38. Balkin, Constitutional Redemption, supra note 2, at 183.
39. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 1.
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conflating one’s constitutional constructions with the Constitution itself; one
can, for example, take care not to frame one’s constructions as timeless and
logically compelled by the constitutional text. Balkin largely succeeds on
this score, as he tends to present his nonoriginalist arguments as the best allthings-considered constructions given who we Americans are as a people at
this time in our history.40
Matters are less clear, however, if one focuses on whether characterizing
one’s constitutional claims in a careful way is self-undermining. Politically,
it may not be a fair fight if one is as subtle and nuanced as Balkin’s historicist participant while one’s adversaries look people in the eye and tell them
without hesitation or qualification—tell them unself-consciously—THIS IS
WHAT THE CONSTITUTION MEANS. It may not matter who is right.
The concern is not merely that effective advocacy of, or resistance to,
constitutional change in the present may require one to suppress public articulation of one’s systemic account of constitutional change. The concern is
not about less-than-full candor but about a more troubling trade-off between
honesty and efficacy.41 Effective advocacy may require the very conflation
of construction with the Constitution that Balkin’s living constitutionalism
denies, at least when one’s adversaries conflate the two.42
In truth, Balkin simply asserts that those who make claims on the Constitution need not “worry that arguing that their views are correct is in any
way undermined . . . by the theory of how the constitutional system produces legitimacy over time” (p. 131). He never really explains why this is so;
the matter does not appear to trouble him.
It would be preferable to be persuaded by Balkin that there is no irreconcilable conflict between the truth of constitutional law’s creation and the
preconditions of its creation. But there may be cause for concern. Someone
who has fully embraced both components of Balkin’s theory must argue
from the individual perspective with the awareness that her views are not
compelled by the Constitution; that there are other reasonable constructions
of the Constitution; that the ability of her adversaries to express their views
is crucial to the system’s legitimacy; that her position is more “best” than
“true”; that it may not have been best in the past and may not be best in the
future; and that she possesses the position she is pressing in significant part
because of the constitutional culture in which she presently lives. She must
see herself and her constitutional convictions as an effect as well as a cause.
Just as the ability of one’s adversaries to express their views is crucial to
the system’s legitimacy, so too is the ability of oneself to express one’s
views—and to do so without one hand tied behind one’s back. The concern,
40. See especially Part II on constitutional construction.
41. Paul Mishkin stressed the distinction between dishonesty and less-than-full candor.
See Robert C. Post & Neil S. Siegel, Theorizing the Law/Politics Distinction: Neutral Principles, Affirmative Action, and the Enduring Legacy of Paul Mishkin, 95 Calif. L. Rev. 1473,
1505 n.168, 1512 (2007).
42. To be sure, there are settings in which those who are the most certain that they are
right do not make the most effective advocates. I am skeptical, however, that American constitutional politics is one of those settings.
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in other words, is internal to the legitimacy of the constitutional system as a
whole. If such legitimacy requires the constitutional conversation to include
all reasonable voices, then participants in ongoing constitutional debates
should not be at a self-imposed disadvantage stemming from the selfconscious manner in which they argue from the individual point of view.
The institutional role that one occupies may make all the difference
here. It is troubling from the standpoint of scholarly integrity that concern
over the efficacy of arguments from the individual perspective might move a
scholar to provide anything but the most accurate account of how our constitutional system functions. By contrast, it may be ethically permissible for
those whose exclusive business it is to adopt the individual point of view—
specifically, judges and advocates with clients—knowingly to make
arguments that conflate constitutional meaning with constitutional construction, and thus to deny the fact of judicial discretion and the existence of
reasonable disagreement.43 If the ethics of distinct institutional roles require
different responses to the potential trade-off between honesty and efficacy,
then scholars, judges, and advocates should respond differently to Balkin’s
book.
B. Modernist Anxiety and Postmodernist Detachment
Much legal scholarship, however, is not entirely sealed off from legal
advocacy, even when the scholar avoids explicit involvement in litigation
and politics. The legal scholar, therefore, may have cause for concern that
adopting Balkin’s systemic account of constitutional change may undermine
the very individual mechanisms that make such change possible. The legal
scholar may not feel free to act as if she were certain she was right when, in
fact, she is not certain.
And yet Balkin does not share this concern. Maybe this indicates differences between him and me in subjectivity and temperament.44 Although
self-diagnosis in a law review is rare, perhaps I suffer from “modernist
43. For a rare attempt by a judge to confront the fact of judicial discretion from the
individual perspective, see McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3103 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[O]nly an honest reckoning with our discretion allows for honest
argumentation and meaningful accountability.”). For an illustration of the vulnerabilities to
which a jurist exposes himself by acknowledging from the individual perspective what is obvious from the systemic perspective, see id. at 3052 (Scalia, J., concurring) (criticizing the
Stevens approach as “incapable of restraining judicial whimsy”). See generally Neil S. Siegel,
Prudentialism in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 6 Duke J. Const. L. & Pub. Pol’y 16 (2010).
44. Balkin is hardly alone. Robert Post writes that “we are long past the day when we
can plausibly imagine judicial work as merely ministerial and mechanical, like the work of a
scribe or a computer,” and “everyone knows that judges have discretion in their interpretation
of the law.” Robert Post, Theorizing Disagreement: Reconceiving the Relationship Between
Law and Politics, 98 Calif. L. Rev. 1319, 1331 (2010). He then observes that “[f]rom the
internal point of view of the law, of course, judges merely follow the law.” Id. at 1331 n.73. He
also notes “the knots that judges get themselves into when they seek to reconcile this internal
perspective with the fact of judicial discretion.” Id. I have difficulty with the “of course” in the
above quotation in light of Dean Post’s preceding (and correct) observations about the fact of
judicial discretion.
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anxiety,” and perhaps Balkin has moved on to postmodernist detachment
and irony.45
In Law, Music, and Other Performing Arts, Balkin and his coconspirator,
Sanford Levinson, investigate the “the increasing sense of isolation and estrangement from the past and from tradition” that is partially constitutive of
modernity.46 Modernists are markers of the passage of time. “An increased
attention to the historicist elements of culture,” Balkin and Levinson observe, “brings with it an understanding of the profound differences between
the perceptions of times past (and irrevocably lost) and those of our own.”47
What is more, our knowledge of the rifts between past and present produces
an awareness that the same ruptures will come to characterize the relationship between present and future.48 This “awareness of historical situatedness
cause[s] us to stand at a suitable distance from our own most deeply held
convictions.”49
Modernism is characterized in part by a deep consciousness of one’s
consciousness—specifically, by concerns about the integrity of one’s consciousness. At the heart of the experience of modernity lie worries about
genuineness—“questions about the meaning of authenticity, whether of
one’s beliefs or practices.”50 “Modernity might be described as the experience of feeling self-conscious about one’s relationship to the past and to
tradition, isolated and alienated—in a word, inauthentic.”51 Such selfconsciousness can undermine confident, unself-conscious participation in a
present cultural tradition or social practice.
When one registers one’s distance from the past (and thus registers the
present’s distance from the future), one can respond with “modernist anxiety,” a feeling of being unmoored or disconnected, at sea. This experience
“produces the emotional search for resonance, tranquility, solidity, and stability.”52 Alternatively, one can find salvation in surrender, accepting in a
detached way the historical ruptures that have been and will yet be. The
postmodernist understands that he is inauthentic in an important sense, but
this does not trouble him. He knows he is playing a role and he is okay with

45. See Sanford Levinson & J. M. Balkin, Law, Music, and Other Performing Arts, 139
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1597, 1627–46 (1991) (book review) (explicating modernist anxiety and contrasting it with postmodernist responses to estrangement from the past).
46. Id. at 1630.
47. Id. at 1631.
48. See id. (“[I]n the future our own mixtures of insight and blindness will be interpreted from that then-present perspective from which one tries to understand the past. We will then
be perceived in ways that we cannot perceive ourselves.” (emphasis added) (quoting David
Brion Davis, The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 1770–1823, at 15
(1975)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
49. Id. at 1632.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1634.
52. Id. at 1637.
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it. “By forsaking modernist anxiety, the interpreter moves closer and closer
towards postmodern irony.”53
The modernist is anxious. The postmodernist asks, “[W]hat anxiety?”54
The modernist is troubled by the irony of the situation in which he finds
himself: just as he condemns the blindness of previous generations, so too
will future generations condemn his shortsightedness. The postmodernist
loses no sleep over this irony. He is at peace with his detachment.
The difference between modernist anxiety and postmodernist detachment may help to make sense of why I worry about the relationship between
the systemic and individual perspectives in constitutional law, and why Balkin does not. The rich historicism that characterizes Balkin’s systemic
perspective captures a defining feature of the experience of modernity: the
perceived chasm that separates the present from the past. Those who suffer
from modernist anxiety respond by asking troubling questions about the
authenticity of their own performances from the individual point of view.
They worry about how they can be so confident that they are correct when
they are so mindful of the historically contingent discretion they are exercising.
Those who possess postmodernist detachment and irony do not pose
these potentially paralyzing problems. From their perspective, nothing good
can come of posing them. Thus Balkin has little or nothing to say about such
matters in Living Originalism. He just makes the best arguments he can in
several chapters. And yet there may be cause for concern, even as one continues to make arguments from the individual point of view.55 All of us are
“trying to figure out how one meaningfully inhabits a practice of performance after innocence has been lost,”56 but we may differ in our responses
to our shared situation.57
Modernist anxiety is triggered by being invested as a participant in constitutional practice who also understands how the constitutional system
operates over time. The tension between the systemic and individual
53. Id. at 1639.
54. Id. at 1646 n.196. So does the premodernist, but for an entirely different reason. See
id. at 1646 & n.196.
55. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Not the Power to Destroy: An Effects
Theory of the Tax Power, 98 Va. L. Rev. 1195 (2012) (arguing that the Taxing Clause justifies
the Affordable Care Act’s minimum coverage provision and shared responsibility payment);
Michael C. Dorf & Neil S. Siegel, “Early-Bird Special” Indeed!: Why the Tax Anti-Injunction
Act Permits the Present Challenges to the Minimum Coverage Provision, 121 Yale L.J.
Online 389 (2012), available at http://yalelawjournal.org/2012/01/19/dorf&siegel.html (arguing that the federal Tax Anti-Injunction Act allows preenforcement challenges to the
minimum coverage provision); Neil S. Siegel, Four Constitutional Limits that the Minimum
Coverage Provision Respects, 27 Const. Comment. 591 (2011) (arguing that the minimum
coverage provision is both justified by the Commerce Clause and consistent with judicially
enforceable limits on the commerce power).
56. Levinson & Balkin, supra note 45, at 1658.
57. And yet Balkin reaches for originalism. So maybe he has more modernist anxiety
than he lets on. Cf. id. at 1644 (identifying “Robert Bork’s jurisprudence of original intention
as a quintessentially modernist response”).
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perspectives may be compared to the tension between the external and internal points of view.58 Those who take the external point of view are
nonparticipants in the system. They are also uninvested in the success of the
system. Thus the external–internal dichotomy captures characteristic disagreements between political scientists and academic constitutional lawyers
over the grounds of judicial decision. Political scientists typically take the
external point of view of the uninvested observer.59 Academic constitutional
lawyers tend to take the internal point of view of the faithful participant who
may (or may not) have views about how the system moves in history.60
The external–internal dichotomy also illuminates the disagreement between H.L.A. Hart and Ronald Dworkin over law’s partial indeterminacy in
hard cases.61 Hart has an unblinking appreciation of the ineluctability of
judicial discretion.62 This is because Hart’s legal theory (positivism) is selfconsciously descriptive; he takes the external point of view.63 Standing
outside of legal practice, he can greet with skepticism the claims of certain
participants inside (called judges) that they always merely find the law and
never make the law.64
Dworkin, by contrast, emphatically rejects the idea that the law ever
runs out. He equates discretion with lawlessness.65 His position becomes
more explicable once one apprehends that his jurisprudence is, to a signifi58. For a classic statement of the distinction between the external and internal points of
view, see H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 88–91 (2d ed. 1994).
59. See, e.g., Martin Shapiro, The Supreme Court and Constitutional Adjudication: Of
Politics and Neutral Principles, 31 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 587, 605–06 (1963) (“To put it bluntly, the real problem is how the Supreme Court can pursue its policy goals without violating
those popular and professional expectations of ‘neutrality’ which are an important factor in
our legal tradition and a principal source of the Supreme Court’s prestige.”); see also Ronald
Beiner, Political Judgment 159–60 (1983) (distinguishing the reflective and “understanding spectatorship” of the historian from the predictive and “objectifying spectatorship” of the
social scientist).
60. Like Balkin, this Review focuses on invested individuals who can view the constitutional enterprise from either the individual or the systemic perspective. There is no modernist
anxiety without investment.
61. See Hart, supra note 58, at 272 (“The sharpest direct conflict between the legal
theory of this book and Dworkin’s theory arises from my contention that in any legal system
there will always be certain legally unregulated cases in which on some point no decision
either way is dictated by the law and the law is accordingly partly indeterminate or incomplete.”).
62. See id. (“If in such cases the judge is to reach a decision . . . he must exercise his
discretion and make law for the case instead of merely applying already pre-existing settled
law.”).
63. See id. at 240 (“My account is descriptive in that it is morally neutral and has no
justificatory aims: it does not seek to justify or commend on moral or other grounds the forms
and structures which appear in my general account of law . . . .”).
64. See id. at 274 (“There is no doubt that the familiar rhetoric of the judicial process
encourages the idea that there are in a developed legal system no legally unregulated cases.
But how seriously is this to be taken?”).
65. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 37–39 (1986) [hereinafter Dworkin,
Law’s Empire]; Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 81–130 (1977).
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cant extent, evaluative and justificatory;66 he takes the internal point of view
(as well as the individual, invested perspective).67 Indeed, in Law’s Empire
he denies any distinction between legal philosophy and legal practice.68
The strength of one is the weakness of the other. Dworkin can make little sense of an obvious fact from the external point of view: the
ineluctability of judicial discretion. Hart never tells us how a judge who is
aware of the external perspective can perform her internal function honestly.
Rather, Hart seems to suggest only that the two points of view are reconcilable in that the external description of a practice may differ from the way it
is experienced internally.69 True enough, but this observation does not solve
the problem of how one is to proceed when in the grip of both perspectives
simultaneously. While Balkin, unlike Hart, is an invested participant in the
system he is analyzing, he too never really tells us how a participant who is
aware of the systemic perspective can perform her individual function honestly and effectively.
III. Balkin’s Framework Originalism
This Part analyzes Balkin’s framework originalism. It argues that Balkin’s approach better accounts for the characteristic importance of the
constitutional text in American constitutional practice than does David
Strauss’s common law constitutionalism, but that Balkin fails to persuasively account for the rare but significant instances in which ostensibly clear text
66. See, e.g., Dworkin, Law’s Empire, supra note 65, at 90 (describing general theories of law as “constructive interpretations: they try to show legal practice as a whole in its
best light, to achieve equilibrium between legal practice as they find it and the best justification of that practice,” so that “no firm line divides jurisprudence from adjudication or any
other aspect of legal practice”).
67. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Pitfalls in the Interpretation of Customary Law, in The
Nature of Customary Law: Legal, Historical, and Philosophical Perspectives 13,
25 n.28 (Amanda Perreau-Saussine & James Bernard Murphy eds., 2007). “Understanding
Dworkin’s claim that there is ‘one right answer’ to any legal question requires understanding
that for Dworkin the important perspective is that of the judge making the decision.” Id.
“When we read Dworkin charitably,” Schauer writes, “we see that his ‘one right answer’ claim
is not an ontological one, but is rather about the processes by which the judge comes to what
he believes to be the right answer.” Id. “And if we see the ‘one right answer’ claim as one of
judicial phenomenology and not one of legal ontology, the claim becomes far more plausible.”
Id.
68. See Dworkin, Law’s Empire, supra note 65, at 90 (“So any judge’s opinion is
itself a piece of legal philosophy, even when the philosophy is hidden and the visible argument
is dominated by citation and lists of facts. Jurisprudence is the general part of adjudication,
silent prologue to any decision at law.”); Hart, supra note 58, at 243 (“[Dworkin] identifies
jurisprudence as ‘the general part of adjudication’, and this is to treat jurisprudence or legal
theory as itself a part of a system’s law seen from the internal viewpoint of its judicial participants.”).
69. See Hart, supra note 58, at 243 (“[T]he descriptive legal theorist may understand
and describe the insider’s internal perspective on the law without adopting or sharing it.”); id.
at 244 (“Description may still be description, even when what is described is an evaluation.”);
cf. id. at 241 (“It is not obvious why there should be or indeed could be any significant conflict
between enterprises so different as my own and Dworkin’s conceptions of legal theory.”).
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does not seem to bind us. This Part then questions the political consequences—for progressives and for the constitutional system as a whole—of
embracing any form of originalism, including Balkin’s.
A. Constitutional Convictions
Why does Balkin, a living constitutionalist if ever there was one, have
any use for originalism of any stripe? In anticipation of cynics and skeptics,
he insists that his motives are pure. “I did not become an originalist to hoist
conservatives by their own petards, or to engage in a shallow ‘metoosim[,]’ ” he writes.70
Balkin’s originalism helps to make sense of some widely shared convictions about the constitutional text—namely, that it is binding law, so that one
is not free to ignore it when it is clear, such as when it states a fully determinate rule. Almost no one is persuaded by “purposive” (re)readings of the
various clauses imposing age qualifications for federal offices.71 Almost no
one argues that Arnold Schwarzenegger may lawfully serve as President.72
And as much as Sanford Levinson laments various structural features of the
Constitution, he does not argue that we are free to ignore them—to abolish
via statute, say, the equal representation of the states in the Senate, the Electoral College, or the president’s veto power. On the contrary, his concerns
spring from the fact that the text is clear on these matters and he cannot responsibly advocate ignoring clear text as being consistent with legality.73
Yet again, Balkin has identified a profoundly important question. Why
do we regard clear text as binding? The answer is not obvious. Balkin’s
framework originalism offers a better answer to this question than the one
provided by a major competitor, David Strauss’s common law constitutionalism.74
Strauss recognizes that constitutional interpreters must establish the
consistency of their interpretations with the text of the Constitution.75
Strauss accounts for the exalted status of the text by offering a “common
ground justification.”76 It is sometimes “more important that things be settled than that they be settled right, and the provisions of the written
Constitution settle things.”77 In Strauss’s view, the text is binding because of
“the practical judgment that following this text, despite its shortcomings, is
70. Balkin, Constitutional Redemption, supra note 2, at 232.
71. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (House); id. art. I, § 3, cl. 3 (Senate); id. art. II, § 1,
cl. 5 (President).
72. See id. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
73. See generally Sanford Levinson, Our Undemocratic Constitution (2006).
74. See sources cited supra note 17.
75. Strauss, supra note 17, at 103 (describing as “one of the absolute fixed points of
our legal culture” that “[w]e cannot say that the text of the Constitution doesn’t matter”); see
id. (“We cannot make an argument for any constitutional principle without purporting to show,
at some point, that the principle is consistent with the text of the Constitution.”).
76. Id. at 101–03.
77. Id. at 102.

Siegel FTP5 B.doc

April 2013]

3/13/2013 9:33 AM

Jack Balkin’s Rich Historicism

947

on balance a good thing to do because it resolves issues that have to be resolved one way or the other.”78
Notwithstanding its well-known virtues, Strauss’s account does not persuasively distinguish the sanctity of the text from the sanctity of judicial
precedent. Precedents may serve the same focal-point function that Strauss
attributes to the text. Revisiting precedents that have long been deemed settled “takes time and energy,” and “can spin out of control and create serious
social divisions.”79 And yet, American constitutional lawyers regard even
Marbury v. Madison80 and McCulloch v. Maryland81 as revisitable, at least in
principle, by the Supreme Court. No portion of truly clear constitutional text
is so regarded. An amendment is deemed necessary to overcome clear text.
A common law approach seems unable to make sufficient sense of the special importance of the text in constitutional practice. The text is more than a
common ground or convenience, and certain parts of it are not subject to
change via common law methods. The text, when it is clear, is characteristically regarded as binding law.
Yet Balkin’s approach, too, is not above criticism. He never specifies the
antecedent theory of obligation according to which clear text binds the present. Instead, he variously and vaguely references original acts of popular
sovereignty (pp. 54–55), rule-of-law values (p. 268), and the need for the
Constitution to be “our law” (p. 268). He should say more. His account incorporates widely shared beliefs about the binding nature of clear text, but
he does not fully explain why these beliefs are correct notwithstanding various objections such as the dead-hand problem.82
Another problem with Balkin’s approach is that ostensibly clear text
does not always seem to bind. For example, there are various ways to try to
negotiate the fact that the First Amendment is directed at Congress alone
(“Congress shall make no law . . . .”) and not at the federal government more
generally.83 Balkin argues that this is a clear case of nonliteral usage—that
“Congress” is a term that “stands for all of the lawmaking and law enforcement operations of the federal government” (pp. 204–05). But
notwithstanding his formidable arguments, these facts remain: the language
says “Congress,” not “Congress and the President” or “the United States,”
and the Constitution elsewhere distinguishes the legislative authority of
Congress (such as Article I, Section 8) from the enforcement power of the
Executive (such as the Take Care Clause of Article II, Section 3).
Similarly, consider Bolling v. Sharpe.84 Chief Justice Warren deemed it
“unthinkable” that the same Constitution would permit race discrimination

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 105.
Id.
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
See pp. 41–49 (discussing the dead-hand problem).
U.S. Const. amend. I.
347 U.S. 497 (1954).
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by the federal government while prohibiting it by the states.85 His point
about “thinkability” likely has more to do with why the case was decided
the way it was—and why it is regarded as legitimate today—than Balkin’s
historical argument that “due process already includes ideas of equal protection” (p. 252).
Consider another possible example. In Balkin’s view, the original meaning of “Commerce” in Clause 3 of Article I, Section 8 transcends
commercial or economic subject matter and includes social interactions.86 I
am persuaded by this broader understanding of “commerce,” but what if it is
wrong? Other jurists and scholars disagree with Balkin on this point.87
Even if he is wrong, I still find it hard to believe (notwithstanding my
modernist anxiety!) that Congress lacks the power to regulate serious
noneconomic problems of collective action facing the states. As I have argued elsewhere, the basic structural purpose of Article I, Section 8 is to
empower Congress to solve collective action problems—including spillover
effects—that the states cannot address as effectively on their own.88 What
about a flu pandemic that disrespects state borders, in which case an individual might be subject to federal regulation—including a mandate to get
vaccinated—by simple virtue of the fact that he is present in a particular
place at a particular time? Robert Cooter and I have unconventionally urged
looking to the General Welfare Clause in such a scenario,89 but I doubt it
will fare any better in terms of original semantic meaning.90
Balkin has a way out of this dilemma if the word “commerce” is ambiguous and its meaning is subject to reasonable doubt: under his theory, one
moves to constitutional construction. In that case, there are sound structural
reasons—that Balkin and I have separately but similarly articulated91—as to
why his account is the best construction of an ambiguous text.92
But Balkin has no way out if there is no ambiguity and he is demonstrably wrong about the original meaning of “commerce.” Even so, the original

85. Bolling, 347 U.S. at 500.
86. See chapter 9; Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (2010).
87. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Jack Balkin’s Interaction Theory of “Commerce”, 2012
U. Ill. L. Rev. 623.
88. E.g., Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General
Theory of Article I, Section 8, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 115 (2010); Neil S. Siegel, Free Riding on
Benevolence: Collective Action Federalism and the Minimum Coverage Provision, 75 Law &
Contemp. Probs. 29 (2012).
89. See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 88, at 170–75.
90. The Court would likely tell an “economic” story and rely on the Commerce Clause.
For a discussion of recent evidence that informs this prediction, see Siegel, supra note 88, at
52–53.
91. See supra notes 86, 88 and accompanying text.
92. For Balkin, structural principles are constructions; they are not part of the framework. As Balkin discusses in Chapter Twelve, however, structural principles can be underlying
principles that are needed to apprehend and apply the text. Those who engage in construction
ascribe structural principles to the text in order to make sense of it.
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meaning would not matter—and should not matter—in the case of a public
health emergency or other circumstances where the stakes are high enough.
Such examples, although atypical, suggest that we do not always view
seemingly clear text as binding. We may not view it as binding if (1) we
perceive something enormously important to be at stake and (2) there are
ways of making the text seem less clear. If ostensibly clear text is more than
a convention or convenience, it may also be less than fully binding under
certain circumstances.
B. Political Consequences
So far I have inquired into whether framework originalism makes sense
of widely shared constitutional convictions. Another conversation worth
having is whether a collective commitment to originalism can underwrite
the legitimacy of the constitutional system as a whole. Because legitimation
of the constitutional system, like the legitimation of any governmental institution, “is constituted by its collective acceptance,”93 answering this
question turns on the potential consequences of talking Balkin’s talk in the
world—how it may move people who are not constitutional scholars and
who do not teach in law schools.
One possibility is that progressive constitutionalists, like their conservative counterparts, will be able to leverage the power of text and history to
express their own constitutional convictions. Thus Balkin writes that
“originalism, textualism, and a return to basic principles resonate so deeply
with the public,” and that “people routinely invoke the founders and their
great deeds in arguing with each other about what the Constitution truly
means.”94 Balkin is right to counsel progressives not to reflexively run from
text and history: constitutional fidelity requires attention to both; they are
often persuasive forms of constitutional authority; and they do not compel
conservative outcomes as a general matter. More ambitiously, Balkin may
pull off a feat of intellectual judo by capturing and repurposing originalism.
But there is another possibility. Ours is a world in which originalism has
been identified with conservatism in American law and politics for decades.95 In such a world, progressive constitutionalists should ask themselves
what conservative activists, politicians, and judges might do with a progressive declaration that “we are all originalists now.”
For example, will such a declaration lend support to viewing the Court’s
decision in District of Columbia v. Heller96 as a good-faith attempt at applying a methodology that (if Balkin succeeds) may appear universally shared?
93. John R. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality 117 (1997); see id. at
118 (“[I]nstitutions survive on acceptance . . . .”).
94. Balkin, Constitutional Redemption, supra note 2, at 233.
95. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America (1990); Antonin Scalia,
A Matter of Interpretation (Amy Gutmann ed., 1998); William H. Rehnquist, The Notion
of a Living Constitution, 54 Tex. L. Rev. 693 (1976); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser
Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849 (1989).
96. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
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The Heller Court’s interpretation of the Second Amendment is consistent
with Balkin’s thin framework, and the Court’s interpretation is one of
several possible constructions of the text.97 Whoever one thinks was the better originalist in Heller, Justice Scalia must have been pleased that Justice
Stevens elected to fight on Justice Scalia’s “turf.”98 What about an originalist
rejection of post-1937 Commerce Clause jurisprudence, as Justice Thomas
urges?99 What about an originalist rejection of abortion rights, which may be
advanced if defenders of such rights concede that the debate should be
decided on originalist grounds?100 Conservative-originalist defenses of
progressive achievements such as constitutional sex equality are likely to
remain exceptional and marginally significant in any event, coming as they
do decades after the key fights were had.101
Some of Balkin’s critics do not appear to register this concern. Judging
from casual conversation in the faculty lounge and conference halls, they
tend to focus instead on whether Balkin himself is politically motivated in
embracing originalism. More important than the purity of Balkin’s heart,
however, is the question of political consequences even if Balkin himself
has the best of intellectual intentions.
Nor does Balkin appear to register this concern. He is an astute observer
of the politics of conservative originalism,102 but he does not consider the
pertinence of these politics to the political reception of his own framework
originalism. Overlooking the potential effects of embracing any sort of
“originalism,” he may misdiagnose the principal causes of progressive resistance to his approach.
Balkin opines that living constitutionalists may resist framework
originalism because (1) “they are not sure what framework originalism actually entails”; (2) “they instinctively fear that originalism of any form leads
to reactionary policies and blocks beneficial change”; and (3) “as members
of a learned elite they tend to associate the Constitution not with its text but
with the rules, doctrines, and commentaries that professional lawyers know

97. Balkin himself has written that Heller was rightly decided. See Jack M. Balkin,
Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 Const. Comment. 427, 436 (2007) (“I
believe that the same history that shows that the Fourteenth Amendment established an antisubordination principle also shows that the Second Amendment protected an individual right
that applies to the states as well as the federal government. This is certainly not my preferred
policy result, and it may have very bad consequences, depending on how the Second Amendment’s guarantees are worked out.” (footnote omitted)).
98. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 637 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
99. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (The Health Care Cases), 132 S. Ct.
2566, 2677 (2012) (Thomas, J., dissenting); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995)
(Thomas, J., concurring).
100. See pp. 214–18; Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 Const. Comment. 291, 291–92 (2007).
101. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (2011).
102. See Balkin, Constitutional Redemption, supra note 2, at 232–33.
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and whose knowledge distinguishes them from nonprofessionals.”103 Here I
think Balkin errs.
If progressive scholars are unsure of what framework originalism entails, then the distinction between interpretation and construction will likely
be lost on activists, politicians, and judges who are accustomed to conflating
originalism with conservatism, and to using originalism in the narrow fashion that Balkin rejects. In political discourse, for example, one routinely
hears arguments from original intent or original expected application (“the
Framers/Founders never would have protected abortion or gay rights”); one
rarely encounters a Balkinian argument about the original semantic meaning
of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses (that supports abortion
rights and gay rights).104 Progressives may thus have good reason to fear
where any originalist approach will lead in America in 2013. Their concerns
may have little to do with preservation of elite forms of professional reason.
The foregoing concerns about framework originalism are especially relevant to progressive constitutionalists, but they are not merely relevant only
to them. If one believes, as Balkin wisely does, that the legitimacy of the
constitutional system depends on a diversity of constitutional convictions,
then one should care whether accepting Balkin’s framework originalism
would toss everyone into an originalist camp that is easily caricatured as
embracing conservative constitutional commitments. This would be unproblematic from a systemic perspective if almost everyone in the United States
was (the same kind of) conservative, but the country is heterogeneous. A
similar problem would be posed if a prominent conservative legal academic
were to call upon fellow conservatives to declare boldly that “we are all living constitutionalists now” during a period of liberal ascendancy in law and
politics.105 In a well-functioning system—a system that gives voice to the
extant diversity of constitutional opinion—one side of a longstanding clash
of constitutional visions does not make fundamental moves that help its adversaries much more than they help itself.
The concern I am raising is empirical. Will Balkin’s work capture
originalism, or will it be captured by the conservative political practice of

103. Id. at 234.
104. See Dorf, supra note 8, at 2022–23 (“The available evidence indicates that members
of the public at large hold views about originalism, but they do not sharply distinguish among
original intent, original expected application, and original semantic meaning.”). Neither do
many members of the news media. For example, Jeffrey Toobin writes that “[o]riginalists,
whose ranks now include Scalia and Thomas, believe that the Constitution should be interpreted in line with the intentions and beliefs of its framers.” Jeffrey Toobin, No More Mr. Nice
Guy: The Stealth Activism of John Roberts, New Yorker, May 25, 2009, at 42, 46. For an
important recent study of public views about originalism, see generally Jamal Greene, Nathaniel Persily & Stephen Ansolabehere, Profiling Originalism, 111 Colum. L. Rev. 356
(2011).
105. See Dorf, supra note 8, at 2044 (“[A]ny reasonably well-informed observer knows
that the term ‘living constitutionalism’ encodes liberal sympathies, just as originalism encodes
conservative ones—and not just for legal elites but for the general public as well.”).
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originalism?106 I fear the latter is more probable. In fact, I predict that Balkin’s originalism will be hijacked and mischaracterized by others who have
a more conservative agenda than Balkin. When it happens, Balkin’s defenders will at least have work like this to cite in response. I do not doubt that
there are times when it is stunningly effective to seize a word or an idea and
redeploy it for different purposes.107 But in this instance, Balkin’s ideological adversaries may be more likely to execute the backflip than he is.
To be clear, I am not suggesting that scholars should remain silent about
some truth out of concern that others will misuse it. Here, a label other than
“framework originalism” would equally (or better) approximate the truth. As
noted in Part I, Balkin’s originalism is so much thinner than conventional
forms of originalism that it is difficult to overstate the contrast. It turns out
that we are not all originalists now, not even Balkin. The umbrella label of
“originalism” misleads more than it leads. It would be more illuminating to
distinguish Balkin’s Diet Originalism from Originalism Classic, and to describe the individual component of his theory as “framework textualism.”
I do not expect Balkin to give up the “O” word. This ship of his has already left the harbor, and his mind has long been on a quest to overcome
apparent oppositions.108 But those who think they may like the taste of Diet
Originalism might consider my suggestion to choose a healthier alternative.
Conclusion
If a common theme links the concerns I have raised about Living
Originalism, it is the difference between constitutional theory in an ideal
world and constitutional theory in the fallen world we inhabit. In an ideal
world, all participants in constitutional debates would resist conflating their
constitutional constructions with the Constitution itself. But in a world in
which one’s adversaries strenuously reject any such distinction, a historicist
appreciation of constitutional reality as it really is may cause one to bring
the nuanced tools of a scholar to a blunter form of social interaction.
In an ideal world, there would be no cause for modernist anxiety and
thus no occasion for self-consciousness about one’s constitutional convictions. But in a world in which innocence has been lost, some of us may
doubt that we can move as effortlessly as Balkin does from the systemic to
the individual points of view, and then back again.
In an ideal world, one could evaluate the extent to which Balkin’s
framework originalism makes sense of our constitutional convictions without considering the real-world implications of declaring that “we are all
106. A third possibility is that a progressive embrace of “originalism” will have no impact—that conceding the label will make no difference.
107. See generally Daniel T. Rodgers, Contested Truths: Keywords in American
Politics Since Independence 3–16 (1987).
108. See, e.g., p. 3 (arguing that the choice between living constitutionalism and
originalism “is a false one” because “[p]roperly understood, these two views of the Constitution are compatible rather than opposed”); p. 21 (calling them “two sides of the same coin”);
J.M. Balkin, Nested Oppositions, 99 Yale L.J. 1669, 1669–72 (1990).
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originalists now” in public debates. But in our fallen world—a world whose
fallenness Balkin writes about so movingly in Living Originalism and Constitutional Redemption—it would be naive and potentially damaging to
proceed in such a fashion.
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